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LAW ENFORCEMENT AND BURGLARY
INSURANCE
EzRA B. CRooxs*
The term "Burglary Insurance," used in the title of this paper,
is not a very happily chosen one. My purpose really is to discover
whether there is any relation between the reported great" increase of
crimes against property and the insurance of property against such
risks. I have found great difficulty in collecting material on burg-
lary, narrowly defined as a felony committed against property "within
the premises, with force and violence, of which there are visible
marks upon the premises, which have been made by entry into the
premises, or, after effecting the loss, have been made in effecting exit
therefrom."
However there is good authority for giving "Burglary Insurance"
a wider significance, for by common usage such insurance is meant to
include insurance against theft and also robbery. Such insurance
risks are usually divided into five classes, namely, 1) residence,
2) mercantile open stock, 3) mercantile safe, 4) -bank, and 5) mes-
senger, paymaster, and office or store robbery. There are also special
classes of risks, such as automobile theft.
It need not be insisted that the field that we are studying is
a large one, and therefore of very considerable social importance.
In 1925 there were sixty companies in the United States doing burg-
lary and theft insurance. For the ten year period from 1916-25 these
sixty companies did a total business of $177,616,086 in premiums. The
six largest of these companies did $77,966,414 of this total business.
But the main significance is not in the totals but in the rapidity
with which this business has grown. In 1903 the total premiums paid
on such insurance was less than $1,000,000, ten years later it was
less than $4,000,000, and ten years later still it had grown to about
$23,000,000, and in 1925 it was $28,200,130. Thus the volume of this
insurance had increased about twenty-nine times in twenty-two years,
and the great bulk of this increase has come in the last ten years,
i. e., since the outbreak of the World War.2
*University of Delaware.
1Lects. on Casualty Insurance, F. S. Garrison.
2Best's Insurance Reports, Casualty and Miscellaneous.
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As students of social phenomena we naturally are interested in
inquiring into the causes for this remarkable development in a business
so closely related to the security of property. Part of this great
increase in burglary insurance has been due to high-pressure salesman-
ship. Circulars issued from the home office to agents are replete with
the urge for more and more business. In the field of Residence
Burglary Insurance, which comprises about 50% of total Burglary
Insurance, it is pointed out that less than 500,000 policies are written
annually, while, it is asserted, there are five million families in the
United States which are acceptable risks.3 So a great increase in
business is expected in this quarter, and this in spite of the fact that
the vice of underinsurance and the moral risk factor are particularly
strongly felt in this type of insurance. From the complaints as to
the difficulty of checking up on the moral risk factor in residence
burglary insurance claims it is quite obvious that many of the 500,000
policies written do not fall within the five million desirable risk total
mentioned above.
But perhaps the greatest stimulus for this increased writing of
Burglary Insurance is the actual increase in burglary, at least of
certain special and spectacular types of burglary, robbery, theft, etc.
In 1921 the situation in residence burglary insurance was reported as
unfavorable, in spite of the fact that the insurance rates had been
raised several times.' In 1924 the criminal depredations cost the
country slightly in excess of three billion dollars, i. e., a quarter of
a million dollars more than one year of the great war cost us, and
about what it costs to run the United States Government for ole
year.5 Only about ten or twelve million dollars of this huge loss
was covered by insurance. So it is argued that too little has been done
by agents in writing this type of insurance.
It is certainly permissible to doubt that any general increase in
crime and misdemeanor exists in this country. A number of students
of the subject, in the best positions to know, assert that we are not
suffering from any such thing as a crime wave, for example, Mr.
Kirchway and Police Commissioner McLaughlin of New York City.
But it is evident that there has been increase in certain spectacular
types of crimes against property, namely, robberies which involve
risks to and actual loss of life. The Protective Committee of the
Burglary, Theft and Robbery Insurance, Millbacher and Carr. (Clipping
from article by F. S. Garrison, in Insurance Library Association, Boston.)
4Leers. on Casualty Insurance, F. S. Garrison.
5Literary Digest, March 28, 1925, High Cost of Crooks, quoted from report
of protective Company of American Bankers Association.
GThe Aetna-izer Supplement, May, 1926.
182 EZRA B. CROOKS
American Bankers Association reports that in 1921 there were 240
burglaries and 97 "hold-ups" committed against their 22,000 member
banks, while in 1924 there were 98 burglaries and 165 "hold-ups."r
This shows an increase of 68 "hold-ups" in three years, and if the
comparison had been made as from 1914 the contrast would have
been much more startling. However when the totals have been made
for both burglaries and "hold-ups" 1921 shows 337 and 1924 shows
263, a decrease of 74.
These figures do not indicate a crime wave against bank hold-
ings but they do constitute a very good "talking point" for insurance
increases on such property. The celebrated "nose for news" of our
American newspapers has given most efficient free advertising ma-
terial to the campaign for increased insurance on all property en-
dangered by burglary and robbery. One bank "hold-up," involving
the dramatic set of shooting and murder, is enough to excite a whole
region, and if this "hold-up" occurs in New York or Chicago it will
serve for the whole country. Our enlightened press will see to that.
The same condition is seen as to pay-roll "hold-ups." Such
attacks on property have increased, and it is natural that there should
be an increase of insurance against such risks after every such loss.
But it may be doubted that it is wise for the insurance companies to
emphasize such losses in their sales talks. There is a tendency to go
too far in this covering of such risks. If the pay-roll is insured why
worry about its loss? But this logic is too simple to be socially
sound. A case is cited of a manufacturing plant in Chicago which
l~ad the custom of sending a woman stenographer in a taxi for the
large pay-roll. When a protest was made as to the danger involved
in this arrangement, the responsible official replied that they were
insured up. to the hilt, including the life of the woman. As to the
woman she could take the job or leave it.
And other disagreeable factors emerge in this problem of hold-
up insurance. It is more than suspected that a certain per cent of
such robberies are staged, with the management on the inside. It is
very difficult for the insurance companies to check-up on such reported
losses, and it is to be feared that the tendency has been in the past
to pay them and lit the matter drop. The easiest way for the in-
surance companies to meet the situation is to raise their premium
rates. on such risks and pass on to the business insured the losses
involved, and thus ultimately to penalize the consuming public. The
companies insuring banks against hold-up risks have zoned the country,
7Literary Digest, March 28, 1925, High Cost of Crooks.
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making the premium rate depend on the history of hold-up losses.
There is a certain justice in this, for the communities should pay,
in one way or another, for the protection of property. The difficulty
with this arrangement is, socially speaking, that the individual honest
citizen has little power to modify the situation and no power at all
to escape its penalty. In any case raising rates has been ineffectual
in solving the problem.
Another method is being tried, that.of offering a discount of 10%
on the premium rates for each armed guard accompanying the money
in transit. This seems in the right direction, that of forcing respect
for property, but it is evidently not going far toward solving the
problem. The amount of money and negotiable securities in transit
every bank day is too huge for it to be possible to find a sufficient
number of courageous and dependable guards for its safe keeping
in communities infested with desperate criminals. And the fact that
the money is fully insured seems to make unnecessary any risky violence
in its protection. Whatever may be said for this type of private
protection of property, it is clearly a substitute for and not a case
of law enforcement.
But the hireling guard is not the only one who fails to see the
necessity for incurring personal danger in the protection of fully
insured funds. A recent news story tells of the hold-up of a theater
manager in a Pacific coast city. It seems that in this instance the
bandits were inexperienced and very nervous and that it became nec-
essary for the manager to assure them that all was well, for the
money was fully insured. What is such a property owner likely to care
whether such bandits are caught or not? Recently in Texas a young
lady college graduate held up a bank, after backing into the vault
and locking up the two members of the strong sex who were in charge.
This young person seems to have a sense of humor, for after her
arrest she said that she had rather be in her fix than in the shoes
of the two men who had been cowed by a girl armed with a rusty,
unloaded revolver. The funds in this case also were fully insured.
But it is not alone in cases where violence is threatened that
easy money is to be had and little enthusiasm shown in the protection
of money, even in large amounts. About contemporaneously with
the two cases cited above one of the largest banks in New York City
i§ reported to have paid out on two bad checks almost one hundred
and fifty thousand dollars. The account goes on monotonously to say
that the actual loss falls on the surety companies which insure this
bank against loss by forgery. And yet when these checks were care-
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fully examined it was quickly seen that the signatures were tracings and
not genuine.' "All that is necessary to prove loss under an insur-
ance policy for check alteration and forgery is the filing of an affidavit
to the effect that the loss has occurred, together with the altered,
forged or falsified check." 9  This last astonishing statement is not
an invention by me, but a direct quotation from one of the leading
insurance journals. It is apparently meant as a boost for the above
type of insurance, for the article goes on to say "To the activities
of the modem criminal there is only one answer and that is the pos-
session of an insurance policy or policies which will pay for the losses
resulting from a criminal act and will thus safeguard the wealth and
financial future of the assured." I should say that this suggestion
is about the worst that could be made for the safeguarding of wealth,
and that the offender against property would be completely indifferent
as to whether it was a bank or an insurance company which suffered
the loss resulting from his criminal act. It may be that we have
reached a pass in this country where the bankers and other possessors
of ready cash are compelled to resort to such dearly bought insurance
against inevitable losses by fraud and violence, but it seems scarcely
appropriate for the casualty insurance companies to push their busi-
ness by advertising their frequent and large losses. One wonders
why this same article goes on to lament the great increase of crimes
such as forgery, and that "conviction, even for a major offense grows
daily more difficult," unless this plaint also is a boost to business.1 0
But conditions within the banks are not much better than those
which threaten from without. The American Bankers Association
warns its member banks against laxity, and the Protective Committee of
this Association says: "In dealing with these controllable crimes,
bankers should be directly interested in the fact that fidelity losses
have increased more rapidly in the past four years than in any previous
period on record. The experience of surety companies shows the
loss ratio on bank fidelity risks to be more than 15% greater than fidelity
losses in other lines."- A case of carelessness in employing is cited
in which one clerk, being tried for embezzlement, had worked in three
banks in five months, embezzling from all three. The first two banks
to suffer let him off when a part of the stolen money was returned.,
Surely such conditions in the citadels of our finance do not help either
8New York Times-about November 27, 1926.
OThe Spectator, Fire and Casualty Section, June 2nd, 1923.lOLiterary Digest, March 28, 1925, High Cost of Crooks.
7,E. A. St. John, Trying to Cut Down Embezzlement, American Industries,
December, 1924.
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in the protection of property or in enforcing the law for such pro-
tection.
The president of a national surety company, in an article in a
trade paper, says that embezzlement is increasing from year to year.
The surety companies paid losses in 1913 of $3,328,789 ($2,030,201
on embezzlements and $1,298,588 on burglaries), and in 1923 they
paid $20,912,796 ($10,371,258 on embezzlements and $10,601,448 on
burglaries), on such losses. This is an increase of 650% in ten years.
This alarmed surety official goes on to say: "Our experience tends
to show that the employer is largely responsible for most embezzle-
ment losses. The employer himself created the opportunity to make
the theft. He does not want to take the time to investigate every em-
ployee thoroughly before he hires him-he wants a plausible salesman.
Theft he relies upon our bond for protection."'1 2  It seems hardly
necessary tiresomely to repeat "What else could be expected?" Did
not the fluent salesman teach this employer that this same bond was
his protection and, as if the urge of large commissions were not
enough, did not the home office of the insurance company furnish
the ammunition of stock selling phrases with which the salesman
was armedW
A certain circular, sent out by one of the indemnity companies
to its managers and agents, makes interesting reading. The year 1916
is praised as the best year yet in this line, and it is said that such
insurance had been found easy to write. Losses of pay-rolls are
cited and the agents are advised to point out to treasurers of com-
panies that if their pay-rolls are lost uninsured this will cause criti-
cism. Agents are urged to get purchasers to take larger amounts of
insurance, and reprints of sensational newspaper headlines, telling of
robberies by "bandits," are enclosed.' 3  This was in 1916. I. wonder
if this company now, ten years later, feels like using such selling
arguments.
There is such a thing as getting ones fingers badly burned with
an excess of success, and the indemnity companies seem to have dis-
covered this homely but salutary truth. The fire in this case was the
open stock insurance situation in New York City. The high pressure
salesman of open stock burglary and theft insurance was gladly re-
ceived by merchants of a certain class in that great center of corn-
merce. Much business was written, and with great satisfaction on
both sides. But this satisfaction was not long mutual, and it was
2Circular of Travelers Indemnity Company, November 21, 1916.
aThe Spectator, August 26, 1926.
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proven again that the volume of insurance written has no necessary
connection with a sound insurance policy.
But something very good came out of 1his sad experience; the
companies writing burglary insurance in New York City were forced
to unite on a common protective policy. This had been attempted
before but competition had been too close to make any effective co-
operation possible. Thirty-one of these companies have formed- a
Central-Burglarly Insurance Bureau and adopted a plan "with a
view to putting an end to staged burglaries and criminally prosecuting
the rings of insurance swindlers." The committee on organization
made six recommendations: 1) Investigate all applications, and pre-
pare a list of undesirables; 2) Investigate all losses reported; 3)
Determine value of stolen merchandise; 4) Recommend amount to
be paid; 5) General purpose: to improve conditions, prevent burglaries,
cooperate with the District Attorney's office in apprehending and
prosecuting burglaries and false claimants; 6) To place in charge a
thoroughly equipped, reliable man, acceptable to the police depart-
ment.14
It is perhaps ungracious to suggest that the wonder is not that
this wise move is now made but that it was not made much earlier.
"Police Commissioner McLaughlin has said that the majority of these
alleged burglary cases are inside jobs."' 5 A "swindling trust" is known
to exist both by the State Insurance Department and by the local
police, and the insurance companies concerned must at least have had
their suspicions, but when it was known that this specialized crime
was organized it was realized that it could be fought only by or-
ganization. Hitherto the insurance companies had worked indepen-
dently. Mr. Leon Hoage, who wrote a series of articles for "The
Insurance Press" says: "Naturally it may seem strange, if 40% of
all so-called loft burglaries and over 50% of all business robberies
have perhaps been staged by rings of the alleged swindling trust for
the purpose of robbing the insurance companies, that there have not
been more arrests and prosecutions before this. I can explain this
by saying that up to a short time ago the insurance companies were
satisfied to break the claims and not have false claimants prosecuted.
There was no cooperation."
It is very certain from all this that there was not much co-
operation which looked in the direction of law enforcement. In an
14Insurance Press, August 25, 1926.
15The Insurance Press, August 25, 1926. Article by D. C. MacIntyre, Supt. of
Burglary Department, Continental Casualty Company.
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article on "Over Insurance and Robbery Risks," in this same issue
of "The Insurance Press,"16 we get some further light on the cause
for this remarkable situation. Here it is said that this over insurance
and its extra moral hazard "is not caused by the people who buy in-
surance so much as by the people who sell it." These hard words
were not spoken by an outside, unsympathetic critic but by the super-
intendent of the burglary department of an important casualty in-
surance company. He believes that the trouble lies in the mistaken
zeal on the part of the agents, but one finds it difficult to believe
that the "higher-ups" entirely escaped such "zeal."
However, this gentleman is undoubtedly right in stuggesting that
much of the trouble has come in the encouraging of a careless, rather
than a criminal, attitude toward property. Countless small retail
merchants, whose daily turn over is not above two or three hundred
dollars, are carrying policies whose maximum indemnity is $1,000.00.
Before this small merchant had the policy he probably made daily
trips to the bank with one or two hundred dollars. "Now, having a
policy sufficient to cover several days' drawings he makes less fre-
quent trips to the bank, thereby increasing the hazard both inside
and outside." And I fully agree that this growing carelessness of
attitude toward the protection of property is at least as dangerous a
symptom as the much talked of criminal attack on property rights.
But have not these insurance companies promoted the very condition,
which they now bewail, by a policy which permitted, and at least
indirectly encouraged, the "full insurance" and even the over in-
surance of the most stealable forms of property?
I do not, of course, mean that these companies actually wish this
increase of "financial crimes," but I think it true to say that they
have not exercised proper foresight and due caution in dealing with
the socially dangerous elements which are necessarily connected with
their business. They have taken measures to limit risks, especially
moral risks. In Personal hold-up insurance money and securities are
insured up to $50.00 only, and this is also the limit on such
property in residence insurance. This is right, for the risk is great
and loss is hard to verify. This discourages dishonesty and careless-
ness on the part of the owners. 7
Perhaps we will have to look elsewhere to find further causes
for the conditions which have been described. A study of the financial
lsBurglary, Theft and Robbery Insurance, G. F. Michalbacher and L H. Carr.
Reprint-Proceedings Casualty Actuarial Society.
17Best's Insurance Reports, Casualty and Miscellanebus, 1926.
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reports of the casualty insurance companies soon brings to one's at-
tention three striking facts. The first of these is the huge cost to
the business of brokers and agents, often over 50% of the total pre-
miums. One large company reports "underwriting expenses" as above
57% of the total premium income.' The interests of the insurance
company and the interests of the insurance brokers and agents are
not always identical. It is no wonder that one hears of complaints
that the broker often forces the company to take a certain per cent
of known bad risks in order to get the rest of his business. This
practice will not aid the newly formed Bureau in New York to
eliminate fraudulent claims. Another striking fact which appears in
these financial statements is the smallness of the per cent of the total
income which is applied to the payment of losses. The fidelity losses
paid in 1917 amounted to but 25% of the premiums received, and
such losses amounted in 1923 to 34% of the income from premiums.
One of the large casualty companies reported losses paid as about
43% of the premiums earned. "Losses paid" constitute the only
concrete service rendered by these companies to the community, and
the percentages given above would not seem to indicate that sufficient
service is being rendered for the cost demanded, especially in a busi-
ness done on such a large scale. The urge to write more and more
business, in spite of mounting costs, would appear to be the root of
the trouble. A feverish state of haste to be big in premiums does
not encourage a right attitude of mind toward careful obedience to
law, either of sound finance or good government.
The third fact which strikes one in these financial statements is
the smallness of the profit which casualty companies make on their
insurance business. In fact losses on such business are often re-,
ported, one of the largest companies reporting a $15,000 loss on its
1925 business. And yet this company is in sound financial condition,
for it reports gains from investments of over a million one hundred
thousand dollars. The writer of this paper makes no pretense to an
understanding of the ways of high finance and it seems wonderful
to him that companies can suffer losses on their supposed business and
yet be prosperous and continue to increase the volume of their losing
business. This mystery may be somewhat explained by the size,
alertness and activity of the finance departments maintained by the
insurance companies. One company, in a line other than casualty,
reports a holding of about sixty million dollars in security, the larger
part being in stocks. Of course an insurance company needs to in-
1sProceedings Casialty Actuarial Society,'Vol. XI, Pt. I, November, 1924.
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vest large sums in order to maintain its legal reserve fund, and it
needs to be well and safely advised, but a safe financial policy would
not necessarily imply a constant and active participation in the stock
and bond markets. The huge funds in the hands of the insurance
companies of this country gives to them enormous financial power,
and the possession of power constitutes a temptation to use it. It
is to be hoped that these companies will not join the ranks of the
so-called investment bankers, but that they will give their attention
to insurance, which is, after all, their legitimate business.
But the real cause of the trouble which we have examined must
lie deeper than we have yet gone. I suspect that this trouble is not
peculiar to the insurance companies at all, but that it is something
which is the matter with our country as a whole. It is difficult clearly
to define this state of mind which is poisoning our institutions, just
because it is so all pervasive and takes on so many expressions. In
one form it is the fallacy of mistaking bigness for greatness. Again
it is seen in our hurry to possess money in order that we may im-
mediately satisfy our desires. It shows in our impatience with all
restraints however socially necessary these rules may be. The attitude
of "going as far as you can-until you are stopped," of "putting
it over," of "getting away with something" are symptoms of this
national trouble. These are not new symptoms of human nature,
but they are particularly dangerous now in a time when we are
possessed of more power than we have judgment to use. We have
mastered the technique of social cooperation but we have not de-
veloped the social responsibility which alone can make safe the use
of this tremendous force. So we are attacking our civilization with
the fruits of its development. The burglary insurance business has
served as well as another to enforce the lesson that the safety of
society must first be provided for, that we cannot for long attack
the laws necessary for social existence and yet at the same time use
these for our advantage.
If I have said anything which has led to the suspicion that I
am biased against the insurance business I wish now utterly to dis-
claim this. It is my conviction that insurance is necessary, burglary
insurance as well as many other types, and that all legitimate types
of insurance may be further extended with profit to society. But it
is my further conviction that sounder principle and practice will have
to be applied by the insurance business if it is to prove itself the
permanent friend of either law or the common good. I thoroughly
agree with the sentiment expressed by Mr. William Leslie in his
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presidential address before the Casualty Actuarial Society that "The
point of view should be that of the public and not that of any single
class of insurance carriers," 19 and to further socialize this fine state-
ment I can only suggest that the public good is also prior to the in-.
terests of the insurance companies. The needed constructive reform
can only come through the insurance companies themselves, and there
are many insurance men who see this more clearly than we laymen
can.
